HOME > 研究活動 > 研究プロジェクト > 2015年度 > 米中パワーシフト環境における日本外交

研究活動

研究プロジェクト

米中パワーシフト環境における日本外交

計画書

研究代表者
(所属)
寺田貴(同志社大学)
研究関係者
(所属)
村田晃嗣(同志社大学)、青山瑠妙(早稲田大学)、河内祐典(IDB)
研究期間 2015年4月~2016年3月
研究概要

13.5億人の人口、世界2位の経済規模と軍事費など、中国の「超大国化」は確実に進んでいる。特に2008年の経済危機以後、軍事予算の削減に着手した米国の軍事・安全保障政策と同地域での同盟システムは最も影響を受けると言える。
本研究の目的は、米中興亡に象徴されるアジア太平洋地域の構造変化により、日本の防衛・安全保障政策の根幹である日米関係が受ける影響、さらに日本外交・政治の対応における因果関係の明確化にある。国際構造分析(中国の超大国化)、準国際構造分析(日米関係の変容)、行為体分析(日本の制度改革、外交行動変化)の3層間の相関関係、特に2つの構造変化を受けた日本の対応を調査し、国際構造変化と国内政治の制度変革との関連分析の重要性を説く国際関係理論の新古典派現実主義の主張に新たなケーススタディを加えると同時に、米中パワーシフトという外交環境下での日本外交の実証研究といった貢献を研究書の出版を通じて目指す。15年度は中国の台頭と日米関係、特にTPPとAIIBに焦点を当てる。

報告書

研究代表者
(所属)
寺田貴(同志社大学)
研究関係者
(所属)
村田晃嗣(同志社大学)、青山瑠妙(早稲田大学)、河内祐典(IDB)
研究期間 2015年4月~2016年3月
実績概要

発表に関しては9月と2月のUSJI weekで2回ともシンクタンクがひしめくDCでもとりわけ権威の高いウィルソンセンターとの共催でパネルを開催した。それぞれ70人以上の聴衆を集めることができたが、質疑応答を含めパネル終了後も活発な議論が展開され、専門家のネットワーク拡大の意味でも成功であった。9月のパネルでは大詰めを迎えたTPP交渉と多くの参加国を集めるAIIBの動きについて、日米中印の専門家がそれぞれの立場から最新の情報と分析を提供した。2月のパネルではAIIBの出現により注目を集める開発金融の分野を、米州開発銀行のチーフエコノミストや元商務省高官との発表を織り交ぜ、新たにラテンアメリカのインフラにおける日米協力の可能性を模索し、従来のアジア太平洋から一歩脱した地域のテーマとなった。また12月に東大安田講堂にて開催されたUSJIシンポジウムに寺田がパネリストとして出席し、TPP交渉妥結の意義と今後の展望、AIIBがもたらすインパクトと日米アプローチの評価などを議論した。

USJI以外では5月に早稲田大学にて開催されたTPPワークショップで寺田が出席し、本プロジェクトが扱うTPPの交渉妥結に向けての議論が重ねられた(早稲田大学特定課題研究費)。海外では寺田が8月にシンガポール国立大学(シンガポール、)、デ・ラサール大学(マニラ)、オーストラリア国立大学(キャンベラ)、11月に英王立国際問題研究所(ロンドン)、12月にオランダ外務省(ハーグ)、2月にフランス国際関係研究所(パリ)にて、本プロジェクトのテーマについてそれぞれ発表を行い、海外の多くの識者との議論を通して本プロジェクト内容の精緻に務めた。

出版業績は次項に記すが、それ以外に2016年最初のUSJI Voiceより代表者の論考が出版される予定である。

活動内容・
研究成果

出版業績(代表者のみ)
Terada, Takashi (2016) “Japan and Entanglement of Regional Integration in the Asia-Pacific: Combining Cutting-Edge and Traditional Agendas” in S.B. Dus and M.Kawai (eds.) Trade Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific: Developments and Future Challenges, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), pp,85-102.
Terada, Takashi (2016) “Japan and Geo-Economic Regionalism in Asia: The Rise of TPP and AIIB”, EAI Issue Briefing, (Soeul: East Asian Institute), 6 February, pp. 1-7.
Terada, Takashi (2015) “Japan-ASEAN Partnership in an Era of Multiple Regional Integration Frameworks” in R. Sukma and Y. Soeya (eds.) Navigating Change: ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership in East Asia and in Global Governance (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange), pp.83-98.
Terada, Takashi (2015) “Assessing Abe's Economic Agenda: Abenomics, TPP, and Domestic Politics", ASAN Special Forum, 3 (4)
寺田貴(2016)「TPPとアジア太平洋経済秩序の未来:なぜ地域統合は競合するのか」『農業と経済』6月号、126‐133頁.
寺田貴(2016)「TPP VS一帯一路:主導権めぐる争いが激化」『週刊エコノミスト』2015年12月29日・16年1月5日合併号、26-28頁.
寺田貴(2015)「特集Iアジア地殻変動の予兆・南シナ海で深まる地域の亀裂─対中政策、安保と経済で協力深化を」『Janet・e-World』11月26日.
寺田貴(2015)「アジアの開発主義」(18-9 頁)、「TPPとは何か-自由貿易協定(FTA)」(230-1頁)、「日本の東アジア(地域主義)外交-近隣外交」(232-3頁)、吉野・谷藤・今村編『論点日本の政治:政治を学ぶための基礎知識』、東京法令出版.

関連イベント
のURL

http://www.us-jpri.org/week/feb2016#event7
http:www.us-jpri.org/week/sep2015#event4

Policy Paper

研究代表者
(所属)
寺田貴(同志社大学)
研究関係者
(所属)
村田晃嗣(同志社大学)、青山瑠妙(早稲田大学)、河内祐典(IDB)
研究期間 2015年4月~2016年3月
タイトル The China-US Struggle Over a New Regional Economic Order

It took five and half years for 12 member states to reach general agreement over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which in encompassing 40 percent of the global economy now proposes to emerge as the largest free trade agreement (FTA) in history. Qualitatively, TPP can be viewed as one of the most ambitious FTAs ever. Dubbed the “platinum standard,” the agreement imposes greater tariff concessions and deregulations than afforded by the World Trade Organization (WTO)—WTO-plus provisions—and includes additional economic rules—WTO-extra provisions—, which affect state-owned enterprises, intellectual property, government procurement, and environmental and labor standards. These provisions took shape at the US-chaired TPP ministerial meeting in Atlanta, September 30 – October 5, 2015, where the last-minute efforts of the 12 trade ministers and their staff not only struggled against domestic politics advancing particular interests at the negotiation table, but also accommodated conflicting demands from other parties. The ministers’ final press conference was rescheduled three times, thus extending the total negotiation period from two to six days, which ultimately produced a draft agreement only 20 minutes before the final ministerial meeting was due to begin. Given that China’s slowing economy has hurt the exports of TPP member states such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, the recent consensus was desperately needed for these countries’ economic prospects; by establishing common rules for trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region, TPP expects to catalyze interconnections in pursuit of common economic rules that will ultimately reduce export dependence on China.

Despite a variety of extant economic and security cooperation initiatives in the Asia-Pacific, China has proposed its own regional institutions in recent years, including the AIIB and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). China also leads the BRICS Development Bank with possibly USD 50 billion in capital and the USD 100 billion–scale Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). In trade and investment cooperation, China has promoted bilateral and regional economic integration; in scale, the most promising initiatives are RCEP with ASEAN and its six dialogue partners, and the China-Japan-Republic of Korea (CJK) FTA—both are under negotiation, but China is expected to engage more seriously towards the conclusion of these deals in response to the TPP general agreement.

A key feature in the US Asian rebalancing strategy is to engage in multilateral arrangements in Asia and the Pacific, and the United States has increasingly resolved to counter the rise of China through an effort to undertake coalition-building with like-minded countries amid the ongoing US-China competition in the region. The decision to implement a coalition-building approach through its participation in TPP was a response to China’s inclination towards East Asian integration through, for instance, an FTA with ASEAN, which became strongly oriented towards developing countries and would contain more exemptions in the form of tariff-elimination duties, with few deregulation requirements that would reform domestic economic systems.

Despite a variety of extant economic and security cooperation initiatives in the Asia-Pacific, China has proposed its own regional institutions in recent years, including the AIIB and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) as well as the SCO. China also leads the BRICS Development Bank with possibly $50 billion in capital and the $100 billion–scale Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). In trade and investment cooperation, China has promoted bilateral and regional economic integration; in scale, the most promising initiatives are RCEP with ASEAN and its six dialogue partners, and the China-Japan-Republic of Korea (CJK) FTA–both are under negotiation, but China is expected to engage more seriously towards the conclusion of these deals in response to the TPP general agreement.[i]

China’s policies towards regional cooperation have comprehensively expanded, especially in South and Central Asia together with India and Russia, as seen by the overlapping memberships. China also expressed its ambition to create a “new Silk Road economic zone” covering these areas, as a potential counterbalance to TPP. Yet, it does not mean that China has entirely escaped from global and regional cooperation where the United States and its allies take their seats. Rather than simply balancing by creating parallel regional concepts, China has preserved its membership in multiple regional cooperation initiatives that sustain cooperation with the United States and even Japan, with which political relations had deteriorated since 2012. Hitherto, the CICA and SCO, at least ostensibly, targeted terrorism, separatism, and extremism, which could be regarded as common threats to security by China, Russia, and India. China’s actions to establish and revitalize regional cooperation could be seen as complementing regional institutions. As the ADB President Nakao Takehiko acknowledged, the ADB can provide about $13 billion in new lending every year, “while Asia needs to spend around $8 trillion on national infrastructure over the next decade to sustain its growth trajectory,” adding, “I understand the reason behind these banks (BRICS Bank and AIIB), so they should be welcomed.”[ii]

These optimistic perspectives should be closely scrutinized. China has aimed through these frameworks to create institutions instrumental in realizing China’s interests or helpful in forging an environment to hamper American and Japanese attempts to realize their interests. Especially, in the field of security, President Xi Jinping’s emphasis on “Asia”[iii] indicates China’s adversarial approach to US intervention in sensitive sovereign issues. Japan and the United States are not members in either CICA or the SCO. Meanwhile, China’s external economic cooperation is more complicated. As RCEP and CJK FTA are regional integration frameworks in which the Chinese way of rule-making attempts to exclude the United States,and could not be simplistically seen as complementary to TPP; it is highly unlikely that China would let these integration frameworks deal with SOEs, for instance, as People’s Daily once acknowledged.[iv] Finally, the BRICS Bank and CRA are increasing China’s political clout, expanding into areas where the global and extant regional institutions have failed to reach.

In short, the upsurge in “new” regionalism in Asia and the Asia-Pacific is a sign of the intensifying Sino-US struggle to shape the regional economic and political order, imposing one’s own sets of norms and rules on regional economic and security agendas. This power struggle has primarily developed around setting standards, not any direct military arms race or trade frictions, as a new way to dominate the regional order-building process. To establish their preferred economic and political rules, the United States and China have employed a coalition-building approach that entails attracting like-minded states and formulating arrangements designed to discourage the other superpower’s involvement. These tactics are intended to support the dominance of one side in standards-setting processes and negate advantages of the other superpower.

The US push for TPP and China’s promotion of AIIB indicate the conspicuous rise of a conceptual competition over economic development and governance. The launch of AIIB may contribute to China’s development model being more popular and gaining more supporters, challenging the US preference for democracy and a market economy. For instance, after the United States suggested that AIIB should “incorporate the high standards of the World Bank and the regional development banks,”[v] Lou Jiwei, China’s finance minister, offered a rebuttal, stating “the West puts forwards some rules that we don’t think are optimal.”[vi] In “The Beijing Consensus,” Halper labeled governance which China has fostered in developing countries “market authoritarianism,” attributing to it a syncretism of capitalism and dictatorship–trade liberalization while keeping at a distance political liberalism and democracy.[vii] The concept inevitably postulates that government should undertake strong interventions in the economy. Bremmer characterizes the concept as China swelling its market to mainly accomplish domestic political goals such as the maximization of national power, and stresses the differences from conventional Western capitalism.[viii]

These views hold open the possibility that the development of AIIB will lead to the proliferation of China’s state-intervening form of capitalism, and that the norm of respecting a free service and investment regime will not be adopted in other integration frameworks such as RCEP. TPP serves as a body on which the United States can rely for emphasizing the values of deregulatory systems in the region. This is the essence of Obama’s repeated statement: “If we don’t write the rules, China will write the rules out in that region.”[ix] With Japan’s economy twice the size of the eight founding participants in the TPP negotiations with the United States, Japan’s entry was viewed as important for the pact’s emergence as the preeminent trade agreement in the Asia Pacific.

According to an optimistic schedule, TPP is expected to launch by 2017 following its ratification by the various member-state congresses. The general agreement reached in the TPP ministerial meeting in Atlanta raised the cost of non-participation in the partnership; outsiders will continually fail to secure maximum trade and investment benefits. This is the crux of strategic significance which Japan and the United States attach to TPP, as China has become more wary of TPP. One lingering question is whether China will seek to join TPP. China’s participation would mean the transformation of TPP into a gigantic economic zone encompassing the world’s three largest economies, which should be welcome by every TPP member state. Transparency concerning business activities in its SOEs, for instance, would be required, thereby levelling the playing field for members’ companies in the huge Chinese market. Froman therefore set the conclusion of a bilateral investment treaty with the United State as a precondition for China’s entry by declaring “it’s a good test case to see whether China is willing and able to meet the high standards that we insist on.”[x] Furthermore, ntry into TPP as a latecomer will also require China to accept all 31 chapters agreed upon by the 12 current member states, including those regarding environmental standards and stronger intellectual property rights, which will leave China little room to introduce national preferences into the agreement’s structure. At this point, however, it is uncertain when China will become ready to commit to TPP’s high-standard agendas.

Since Obama and Abe perceive that China is challenging them in a bid to cultivate a different economic order in the region, as evident in their decision not to join the AIIB, China’s entry into TPP would bring it more benefit than cost. China’s domestic reforms, as seen in the Shanghai Free Trade Zone, in which 18 service sectors, including finance, tourism, and medical care, are being liberalized, can be instrumental in concluding the investment treaty with the United States and promoting its eventual participation in TPP, and altering such adversarial views. With China as a member, TPP could serve as a practical platform, nurturingshared interests, facilitating expanded political dialogue toward reducing differences, and further increasing commonalities regarding economic rules among the three biggest world economies. This is a pragmatic way for realizing the FTAAP concept, which three nations are commonly pursuing as a long-term objective of their trade strategy, conducive to stabilizing the region.

[i] Terada Takashi, “Trade winds: Big Power Politics and Asia-Pacific Economic Integration,” Global Asia, Vol. 7, No. 1, (Spring 2012), pp. 90-95.

[ii] Bloomberg News, May 11, 2014.

[iii] Xi Jinping keynote speech delivered at 4th CICA Summit, May 21, 2014.

[iv] People’s Daily, March 2013.

[v] The Guardian, March 12, 2015.

[vi] China Spectator, March 23, 2015.

[vii] Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century, (New York: Basic Books, 2010)

[viii] Ian Bremmer, “State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2009..

[ix] The Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2015.

[x] The Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2015.

ご支援のお願い
  • 連携大学

  • GET UPDATES

    USJIでは、イベント等の情報をメール配信しています。お申込み/配信停止はこちらから。